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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action by Plaintiff to compel the Defendant to pay for some 1,600 tons of top soil which Defendant had previously removed from land owned by the
Plaintiff, and for which no payment had been made. Defendant counterclaimed alleging the existence of a lease
agreement and prayed for an award of damages resulting
from Plaintiff's repudiation of said lease.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a trial on the merits before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge of the Third Judicial District for
the County of Salt Lake, sitting without a jury, the Court
held that the testimony presented, together with the practice over the years indicated that Defendant was under
no obligation to pay for said top soil until such time as it
had actually been sold by him.
The Court further held that the statute of limitations would bar any claim which the Plaintiff might have
at such time as the soil might be sold.
The Trial Court held that the terms and conditions
of the purported lease agreement were so vague and uncertain that the Court could not interpret them. The
Court held that Defendant's prayer for damages could not
be granted because the damages were so speculative. The
Court held that even if it could find for the Defendant,
it would be unable to determine damages.

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
As Respondent, Plainitff seeks affirmance of the judg- ,
ment of the Trial Court denying Defendant, Appellant's
Counterclaim and prayer for damages.
As Cross-Appellant, Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the
judgment of the Trial Court denying Plaintiff's claim.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Although Plaintiff generally agrees with the chronological development of the facts as stated by Defendants, ,
certain pertinent facts have been misstated, certain per-
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tinent facts have been omitted entirely and certain erroneous conclusions have been drawn from the facts as stated.
Defendant's statement of the facts is not reflective of the
true posture of the case. It is mainly an argument of Defendant's point of view and not of assistance in determining whether the judgment below is supported by the evidence.
Plaintiff has for a period of many years owned certain patented lode mining claims in Little Cottonwood
Canyon of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. (R-1, 7, 9).
In 1953 the Alta Wasatch Development Company was
formed by several officers and directors of the Plaintiff
company. (Defendant's Deposition pages 10, 11, 12, 69).
The purpose of the new company was to develop mineral
interests on the Flagstaff claim, one of the claims owned
by Plaintiff company. (R-109, Defendant's Deposition
pages 11, 12, 69).

1

The Defendant, who was an officer and director of
the Alta Wasatch Development Company, (Defendant's
Deposition pages 7, 8, 10, 66) , and also an officer of the
Plaintiff company, (Defendant's Deposition pages 14, 64),
felt there was some economic value to the top soil on
Plaintiff's land. He made a proposal to the other officers
and directors that he be given the opportunity to remove
some of this soil for purposes of resale. Defendant claims
to have entered into a written agreement with one corporation or the other, granting him this opportunity. (R-117,
118, Defendant's Deposition pages 15, 16, 18). Neither
Plaintiff nor Defendant have been able to produce even
a copy of this agreement. It would appear that it is either
lost, (R-117, 114, Defendant's Deposition pages 19, 23),
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or that it was "scrapped" in 1956. (Defendant's Deposition page 23). Consequently, the parties and terms of this
alleged original agreement are not known.
Defendant introduced into evidence three documents
which he claims are amendments to the alleged original
lease agreement, in an attempt to establish the terms and '
conditions of the alleged agreement. (Exhibits D-3, D-4
and D-7).

During the time the Defendant and Plaintiff have
been associated, a considerable amount of top soil has been
removed by the Defendant. In approximately 1952, Defendant removed one truckload of soil for experimental
purposes (Defendant's Deposition pages 35, 36), and
again in November of 1955, fifty tons were removed for
additional tests (Defendant's Deposition page 36). Dur- ,
ing the Fall of 1963, an additional 260 tons were removeJ.
All of this soil has been paid for by the Defendant, (Defendant's Deposition pages 36, 42), and consequently, is
not included in Plaintiff's claim against Defendant.
During the Fall of 1958, Defendant removed an additional 1,600 tons of soil from the property of the Plaintiff.
This soil was stockpiled in Salt Lake City, Utah, at the
home of the Defendant's sister and neighbor, pending
shipments during the Winter to purchasers in Las Vegas,
Nevada. (Defendant's Deposition pages 16, 17, 38, 39,
52). Of the 1,600 tons of soil in the stockpile, approximately 300 tons have actually been shipped to Las Vegas.
Defendant argues that in September of 1958, at a
meeting of the directors of Plaintiff company, at which
time he was granted permission to stockpile the soil, it
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was further orally agreed that he need not pay for said
soil until it had actually been sold. ( R-83, 86, 87, 97).
Plaintiff contends that no such agreement was ever made
on behalf of Wasatch Mines Company and that, in any
event, no one contemplated that the soil would not be
sold within a reasonable short period ( R-52, 84, 95), or
that Defendant would refuse altogether to sell the soil or
pay for it after a lapse of 11 years.
On April 16, 1963, during a board of directors meeting of the Alta Wasatch Development Company, the
agreement between the Plaintiff, Alta Wasatch Development Company, and the Defendant was mutually declared
terminated, without objection from Defendant. (R-164,
Cook's Deposition pages 11, 12, 19, 20). There is evidence that Defendant himself was at this meeting and
voted to terminate the agreement. (R-146, 149, Exhibit
E, Defendant's Deposition). Defendant disputes this evidence. (Defendant's Deposition page 46).
At a meeting of the board of directors of Plaintiff
company held the same evening, Defendant made proposals ". . . concerning his desire to obtain a contract to
remove soils and earths from the Wasatch Mines Company property ... ". (Exhibit H, Defendant's Deposition).
On September 23, 1963, at a meeting of the board of
directors of Plaintiff company, further proposals were
made by the Defendant and his attorney regarding the
delinquent payment for the soil which had been removed,
and regarding future soil removals. (R 138, 147, 148, 151,
Defendant's Deposition page 46, Exhibit I, Defendant's
Deposition).
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On August 31, 1964, Mr. C. W. Love, corporate secretary of Plaintiff company, sent a letter to the Defendant
instructing him not to remove any additional soil until '
the soil already removed had been paid for, and until proposals made at the previous meeting had been completed.
(R-130, Exhibit F, Defendant's Deposition).
Thereafter, Defendant never removed any soil from
Plaintiff's property and the matter rested until this action
was brought.
ARGUMENT OF RESPONDENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT.
IF ENTERED INTO, WERE TOO VAGUE AND UNCERTAIN FOR ENFORCEMENT.
Defendant claims to have an existing leasehold interest in the real property owned by the Plaintiff. This claim
is based upon an alleged agreement executed by certain
parties in 1954, together with three documents presented
by the Defendant which, Defendant claims, are amendments to the original agreement. (Exhibits D-3, D-4 and
D-7).
Wasatch Mines Company, Respondent herein, is the
owner and operator of mineral properties, and its principal business is the sale of minerals and mineral materials,
including soil.
In 58 Corpus Juris Secundum, Mines and Minerals,
Section 143 (b), we read:
... in a contract for the sale of minerals or interests

.
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therein, there must be mutual assent or meeting of
the minds, a sufficient consideration, and the contract must be clear and unambiguous, and capable
of being performed. (Emphasis added).
An analysis of the evidence clearly reveals that the
terms and conditions, as set forth in Defendant's exhibits,
are not only vague and uncertain, but ambiguous and incomplete.
If, as Appellant asserts, some agreement existed between Plaintiff and Defendant, what is the "agreement"
upon which Appellant must rely? Could the "agreement"
he asserts possibly give rise to the rights he asserts in Plaintiff's real property?

Defendant alleges the existence of an early agreement
made sometime in 1954 between Defendant and a third
party not joined in this action, and Plaintiff. No living officer of Plaintiff can recall such an agreement. Defendant
admits that whatever writing existed in 1954 has been lost
or destroyed ( R-117, 144). He cannot recall certain terms
or conditions contained in the writing, or what was required by way of compliance. He states, with respect to
the original agreement, "I think it was scrapped when this
was written" (Defendant's Deposition, page 23), referring
to the 1956 instrument. How can any Court interpret and
enforce a non-existent agreement which Defendant claims
was "scrapped" in 1956?
Thereafter, Defendant carried on a variety of negotiations with Plaintiff's mining lessee, Alta Wasatch Development Company, and Plaintiff's directors, adjusting
the value of the soil, determining the division of payments,
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and other matters. That Defendant was operating under
some form of oral or written agreement from 1954 to 1963
is not really in dispute, but the nature and provisions of '
the agreement, and whether it is still in effect, are the
basis of the controversy.
According to the evidence presented at trial, Defendant's asserted rights stem from a confused chain of oral
and written "agreements" which resulted from various negotiations. The evidence indicates that these "agreements"
were formally terminated by mutual consent in 1963.
Thereafter, Defendant made proposals to the Plaintiff
concerning a new agreement, but no new agreement was
ever agreed upon or entered into.
What was the nature of the pre-1963 "agreement''?
Defendant relies upon only three separate documents to
establish his "rights": ( 1 ) a "Lease Amendment" dated
February 9, 1956 which purports to amend a prior lease
dated February 11, 1959, which is a practical impossibility; ( 2) an "Amendment to Agency Agreement" dated
February 11, 1959, of which Plaintiff is not a party, and
which is not a lease upon real property; and ( 3) an
"Amendment to Lease" dated March 1, 1959, which deals
with the division of proceeds from soil sales. None of these
documents, taken separately or in combination, contain
or can be construed to contain the basic elements required
to vest rights in real property. It would appear that prior
to 1963, Defendant had a vague understanding or agreement by which he removed soil from Plaintiff's real property. At best, the "agreement" was merely Plaintiff's consent for Defendant to take the soil, a schedule of payments
for soil removed, and a division of the proceeds among the

,
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Plaintiff, Plaintiff's mining lessee and the Defendant. It
was never intended to establish a right to the real property
owned by the Plaintiff and did not do so.
After the termination of the "agreements" in 1963,
small quantities of soil were removed by the Defendant,
but on a strictly cash sale basis, the same basis on which
Plaintiff would sell soil to any other party.
POINT II
ANY LEASE, AGREEMENT, C 0 NT RAC T,
PROFIT A' PRENDRE, ETC., THE DEFENDANT
MAY HA VE HAD WITH THE PLAINTIFF IS NO
LONGER IN EFFECT BY VIRTUE OF ITS TERMINATION IN 1963.
On April 16, 1963 at a board of directors' meeting
of the Alta Wasatch Development Company, the agreement between Plaintiff, Alta Wasatch Development Company and the Defendant was declared at an end and terminated. The minutes of this meeting, (Exhibit E, Defendant's Deposition), indicate that said termination was due
to Defendant's failure to pay for soil which he had removed. The minutes further indicate that Defendant was
present and expressed no opposition, implying that he himself voted to terminate the agreement. This evidence was
substantiated by the testimony of Lee Cook, a director of
Alta Wasatch Development Company, who was in attendance at the meeting, (Cook's Deposition, pages 19, 20),
and also by the testimony of Clair M. Aldrich, Esq., a
Director and legal advisor for the Plaintiff, who was present, but not participating in the meeting. Mr. Aldrich testified as follows:
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. Alta Wasatch directors voted to throw in the
sponge, wipe the slate clean, and Mr. Hopkinson
was present and he voted for it. I remember that
distinctly. (R-146. See also R-148, 151).
Later that same evening a meeting of the directors
of Plaintiff company was held. The minute entry of this
meeting, (Exhibit H, Defendant's Deposition), indicates
that the purpose of the meeting was to
... consider a proposition to be submitted by William Hopkinson, concerning his desire to obtain a
contract to remove soils and earths from the Wasatch Mines Company property in the vicinity of
the Wasatch Drain Tunnel.
This evidence was also substantiated by Mr. Aldrich's testimony. (R-146).
Defendant admits on page 58 of his Deposition that
on the morning of April 17, 1963, the day following the
meetings, he was informed by Mr. C. W. Love, President
of Alta Wasatch Development Company and Secretary of
Plaintiff company, that he no longer had a "lease."
At the September 23, 1963 board of directors' meeting (Exhibit I, Defendant's Deposition) Defendant appeared with his counsel and made proposals concerning
the delinquent payments and a new agreement to remove
soil. He promised to furnish a map of the area where he
proposed to remove soil and to obtain a clearance from the
Health Department and Forest Service. The minutes of
the meeting expressly state that no action was taken on
the proposals at that meeting. The matter of a new agreement apparently died when the Defendant failed to comply with his promises.
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On August 31, 1964 Plaintiff's corporate secretary,
Mr. C. W. Love, wrote Defendant informing him that he
was to remove no soil until the amount previously removed had been paid for, and until the proposals previously made had been completed. Defendant subsequently
removed no soil and the matter rested until this action
was brought.
The evidence clearly shows that any agreement which
may have been in existence between the parties was terminated in 1963, and further, that the Defendant was fully
aware of its termination, and in fact complied with the
termination.
POINT III
DEFENDANT'S FAIL URE TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES
JUSTIFIES THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT
DAMAGES WERE TOO SPECULATIVE TO WARRANT AN AWARD.
It is elementary hornbook law that damages may not
be awarded where not supported by proper evidence. Contrary to Appellant's argument, damages must be established with some degree of exactness and certainty. "Damages must be proved with all the certainty the case permits and cannot be left to conjecture, guess, or speculation." 25A Corpus Juris Secundum, Damages, Section 162
(2), page 79.

The Utah Supreme Court held in the case of Bunnell
vs. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 90, 368 P. 2d 597, ( 1962) that
in order to recover damages, the complaining party must
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prove not only that a loss has been suffered, but also must
prove the extent and amount of that loss. Justice Callister
said, "Damages cannot be found from mere speculative
and conjectural evidence." (See also Bing ham Coal and
Lumber Co., et al., vs. Board of Education of Jordan
School District of Salt Lake County, 61 Utah 149, 211
Pac. 981, ( 1922) ; 15 Arn. Jur., Damages, Section 356,
pages 795-797).
Defendant's claim for damages is based upon the purported loss of profits he suffered as a result of Plaintiff's
repudiation of the agreement. Defendant's mere showing
of sales made during the preceding ten years would not be
sufficient to meet his burden. In Gould vs. Mountain
States Telephone and Telegraph Company, 6 Utah 2d
187, 309 P. 2d 802, 806, (1957) the Utah Supreme Court
affirmed the Trial Court's action of setting aside a verdict
for prospective profits because the complaining party had
failed to show a single instance of loss of prospective business caused by Defendant's breach. In this case, Defendant
Hopkinson has also failed to produce evidence of a single
customer lost as a direct result of Plaintiff's action.
Appellant states that he did not attempt to make
additional soil sales after 1964 because if he got a "big
buyer" he would not be able to meet the demand for soil.
(R-167). Prior to this time Defendant's cumulative sales
of soil totalled only 560 tons to many individual purchasers
during the period of 1958-1964. Since 1959 Defendant has
has approximately 1,300 tons of soil in his stockpile. Defendant has never been instructed or admonished not to
sell this soil. It would appear from the evidence that Defendant's loss of profits, if there are any, resulted from his
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own lack of diligence rather than any alleged breach by
Plaintiff.
Appellant claims further damages for expenses incurred by him in reliance upon performance of the agreement. However, Appellant failed to present any evidence
indicating what these expenses were, and how they were
in reliance upon an agreement.
Defendant's admission that his prayer for damages
was a mere "guesstimate" (Defendant's Deposition, page
67), coupled with his failure to produce any evidence at
the trial, is substantial basis for the Trial Court's ruling
that the damages were too speculative to justify an award.

RESPONDENT'S CONCLUSION
The lower court, as trier of the facts, after hearing
the testimony of the witnesses and analyzing the evidence
prt>scnted, was unable to define the terms and conditions
of any agreement between the parties. After having heard
the evidence regarding its termination, the Trial Court
refused to find a binding, enforceable agreement between
the parties, and consequently dismissed Defendant's claim.
Defendant's claim for damages failed because of a
lack of evidence to substantiate the claim.
The record contains substantial evidence to support
the decisions of the Trial Court regarding the denial of
Defendant's Counterclaim, and as such, it should not be
disturbed on appeal.
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ARGUMENT OF CROSS-APPELLANT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO
PAY FOR THE SOIL REMOVED UNTIL IT HAD
ACTUALLY BEEN SOLD BY THE DEFENDANT.
Defendant has admitted ( 1 ) that he removed 1,600
tons of top soil from Plaintiff's property; ( 2) that he
agreed to pay for said top soil at the rate of $4.80 per ton;
and ( 3) that he has never paid for said top soil despite
demands made upon him by the Plaintiff. ( R-6)
Defendant argues that in September of 1958 the directors of Plaintiff company authorized him to defer payment for the soil removed to the stockpile until such time
as it was actually sold by the Defendant. Plaintiff contends
that no such agreement was ever made on behalf of Plaintiff, and that, in any event, no one ever contemplated that
the soil would not be sold within a reasonable period of
time.
Mr. L. L. Cook, a director of Plaintiff company, who
was present at the meeting where such permission was
allegedly given, testified that it was agreed that Defendant would pay for the soil as he removed it from the
mountain, as he had always done in the past. (R-105, 109,
114, Cook's Deposition page 34).
In April of 1963 the Defendant, together with two
directors of Plaintiff company, who were also present at
the 1958 meeting, met and terminated the agreement between the parties because Defendant ...
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.. was in default by reason of the fact that said
W. H. Hopkinson had removed some 1,600 tons
and had stored the same at the home of his sister
in Salt Lake and had never paid for the earth removed. (Exhibit E, Defendant's Deposition).
In September of 1963 the defendant and his attorney
met with Plaintiff's board of directors and proposed that
Defendant pay for the soil for which a demand had been
made. The following August the Plaintiff's corporate secretary made a further and final demand upon Defendant
for payment for the soil which he had removed and not
paid for.
Every witness at the trial, including the Defendant,
testified that it was contemplated that all of the soil in the
stockpile would be sold during the Winter of 1958, or at
least within a reasonable time thereafter. ( R-84, 95, 104,
Defendant's Deposition pages 16, 17, 52). No one dreamed
that 11 years later Defendant would still have the soil in
his stockpile, would still refuse to pay for it, and would
even refuse to make any efforts to sell the soil.
)

)

t

'

The facts do not reflect, as held by the Trial Court,
that it was the practice over the years for Defendant to
pay for the soil as it was sold. In 1952, and again in 1955
when Defendant removed soil for experimentation, Defendant immediately paid for the soil as it was removed.
(Defendant's Deposition pages 35, 36). Again in 1963 the
Defendant removed approximately 260 tons of soil and
immediately paid for it. (Defendant's Deposition pages
36, 42). The only soil which has been removed by the Defendant and not immediately paid for, is the soil which
is the subject matter of this lawsuit. The evidence would
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seem to indicate, contrary to the holding of the Trial
Court, that it was the practice ove the years for Defendant to pay for the soil as it was removed, not as it was
sold.
Assuming, arguendo, that Defendant was given permission to defer payment until this particular amount of
soil was sold, what court would deny Plaintiff the right to
force Defendant, after total lapse of 11 years and inaction
by Defendant, to remit full payment for the soil? Defendant has had total custody of the soil and his inaction has
worked a hardship upon Plaintiff. What may well have
been a reasonable arrangement at the time it was purportedly made, has by Defendant's inaction and unreasonable delays become an unconscionable agreement. This
Court can remedy the inequity only by requiring Defendant to pay for the soil he has had for 11 years.
Cross-Appellant prays that this court declare that the
"reasonable time" to complete the sale, as contemplated
by the parties to such alleged agreement, expired in 1964,
when Plaintiff made the final and formal demand upon
Defendant, and that the agreed upon price became due
and payable notwithstanding Defendant's neglect to actually sell the soil.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY HELD
THAT ANY CLAIM PLAINTIFF MIGHT HAVE
WOULD BE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Appellant argues, and the Trial Court has held, that

.
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Defendant is not obligated to pay for the top soil until
such time as it is actually sold. In addition the Trial Court
held that Plaintiff's claim is barred by the statue of limitations.
Rule 9 ( h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part as follows:
In pleading the statute of limitations it is not necessary to state the facts showing the defense but it
may be alleged generally that the cause of action is
barred by the provisions of the statute relied on,
referring to or describing by section number, subsection designation, if any, or otherwise designating
the provision relied upon sufficiently clearly to
identify it.
In Tanner vs. Provo Reservoir Co. et al., 78 Utah
158, 2 P 2d 107, 111, (1931) the Utah Supreme Court
held that "the defense of the statute of limitations is not
available unless pleaded." In the case of Spanish Fork City
vs. Hopper, 7 Utah 235, 26 Pac. 293, 294, (1891), wherein Defendant's Answer merely stated that the action was
barred by the statute of limitations, the Utah Supreme
Court held that no issue as to the statute of limitations
was raised because Defendant failed to plead the section
of the code relied upon.
Both Defendant's Answer (R-7) and his untimely
Amendment to the Answer (R-23) fail to properly plead
the statute of limitations due to his failure to specify which
of the many statutes of limitations he is relying on. The
trial court erred in ruling on Defendant's improperly plead
affirmative defense based on some unspecified statute of
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limitations, and Appellant cannot now raise or rely upon
the statute of limitations.
Furthermore, it is Defendant's burden, due to his
affirmative defense, to produce facts at the trial which
would support the allegation that Plaintiff's claim is
barred. (See Kimball vs. M cCornick, 70 Utah 198, 259
Pac. 313, 31 7, ( 1927).). Defendant Hopkinson failed to
produce any evidence in response to this burden. In fact,
no mention of the statute of limitations was made by the
Defendant subsequent to the "faulty" pleading.

'

Assuming Defendant had properly plead the statute
of limitations, what particular statute is he relying on?
Appellant's whole argument is that his rights are founded
upon a series of written documents, which he asserts are ·
still in effect. Appellant further contends that all of the .
soil was taken under the same general arrangement. The
applicable statute of limitations over the type of transaction claimed by the Defendant is Section 78-12-23 ( 2),
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which specifies a 6 year
period. The evidence presented supports Plaintiff's contention that the agreement terminated in 1963. This action was commenced well within the 6 year period following termination of the written agreement.
CROSS-APPELLANT'S CONCLUSION
This action was commenced as a simple action to ,
collect the value of soil removed from Plaintiff's land by
the Defendant, acting pursuant to an earlier permission to
remove soil. The quantity of soil involved, 1,300 tons,
and the value of the soil, $4.80 per ton, is not in dispute.
Defendant alleges some form of agreement from Plaintiff

f
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giving him a long term property right in the property from
which the soil was removed. Defendant further claims
astronomical damages by reason of Plaintiff's denial of
his alleged property right. Tacked on to this absurd and
completely unsupported set of charges is a claim by Defendant that, on the basis of some oral promise made in
1958, he is not yet obligated to pay for the soil.
The Trial Court patiently heard every shred of evidence bearing on this matter and ruled that the terms of
the agreement were so speculaive as to be unenforceable
and that Defendant's claim for damages could not be supported by the evidence. The Trial Court further held, contrary to the evidence, that Defendant is not obligated to
pay for the soil until it had been sold by the Defendant,
that he is not yet obligated, and further, that when it
becomes due, Plaintiff's claim would be barred by the
statute of limitations. This latter part of the court's ruling
is inconsistent with both law and reason, and will not
stand up on review.
Respectfully submitted,
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NESLEN AND MOCK
Richard R. Neslen
Robert G. Pruitt, Jr.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Respondent and
Cross-Appellant
1000 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah

